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Introduction 
The  lack  of  knowledge  is  certainly  one  of  the  biggest  obstacles  to  advancement.  To 
choose to ignore because of difficulties associated with change - whilst logical, constitutes 
an even greater challenge to progress. However, to choose to ignore, for no plausible 
reason at all, constitutes the greatest challenge in the path of progress. What constitutes 
the  definition  of  progress  may  also  be  viewed  from  several  perspectives.  Whilst  cost 
reductions enhance progress, failure to address risks which have been building up, may 
eventually generate problems which are greater than the initially perceived costs. Many 
decision  making  processes  involve  cost  benefit  analyses  and  whilst  agency  costs  - 
particularly those attributed to monitoring, may, initially be greater, the eventual benefits 
will gradually exceed those costs. 
The past three to four decades have witnessed waves of global changes in respect of 
globalisation, conglomeration, improved technology, increased competition, as well as a 
rise in transactions involving complex derivatives and financial instruments in financial 
markets. Such global changes have necessitated huge shake-ups in various jurisdictions 
whose structures of financial regulation have evolved from that of functional regulation to 
unified and integrated structures. One typical example is the UK and German banking 
systems  of  regulation.  Various  jurisdictions,  notably,  within  Scandinavian  jurisdictions, 
have  also  adopted  unified  structures  of  regulation  and  whilst  other  jurisdictions,  are 
attempting to address the challenges attributed to cross sectional services risks, such move 
has  been  difficult  owing  to  the  level,  scope  and  size  of  embeddedness  of  such 
jurisdictions' financial and institutional structures in the existing systems of regulation. 
Whilst a “one-size-fits-all” approach can certainly not address every jurisdiction's needs, 
the importance of Basel Committee rules and regulations as a means of ensuring a degree 
of consistency - as well as incorporating rules in relation to increased transparency and 
disclosure, cannot be over emphasised. 
Risk, regulation and conglomeration have become so inter-woven owing to the evolving 
nature  of  risks  -  particularly  as  a  result  of  complex  changes  within  the  financial 
environment. Counter party credit risks, as well as other forms of risks, complex financial Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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instruments, and increased shadow banking activities, all contributing to the problem of 
effectively monitoring and managing such risks. 
With such changes taking place, and the financial environment constantly evolving, the 
need to effectively monitor and address such risks becomes all the more important in 
corporate governance structures and systems. 
Sarkar argues that ownership and control structures, as well as institutional set-ups in 
which  such  corporations  are  assimilated,  determine,  to  a  large  extent,  the  nature  of 
corporate governance problems in business enterprises and corporations (Sarkar, 2010, 
p.217). In so doing, he distinguishes between the nature of agency problems which are 
peculiar to concentrated ownership and control and those which are synonymous with 
diffuse ownership structures. With diffuse structures or dispersed ownership structures, 
“agency problems arise on account of shareholder - manager conflicts” - such agency 
problems  being  referred  to  as  Type  1  or  vertical  agency  problems  (Ibid,  p.220).  The 
agency problem attributed to dispersed ownership is also principally regarded as being that 
of the control over powerful management. 
Contrastingly, “additional agency problems” are considered to arise under concentrated 
ownership:  namely,  the  control  of  dominant  shareholders  and  their  influence  over 
management (Odenius, 2008, p.14). Even though it is argued that in certain countries with 
concentrated ownership structures  (for example, countries such as France, Germany and 
Italy - where families own large blocks of shares and dominate corporate structures), that 
effective control exists since such owners are able to access the required resources needed 
to  engage  in  monitoring  activities  -  hence  resulting  in  less  information  asymmetries, 
transparency is also an issue in many countries where concentrated ownership structures 
prevail. According to Eun and Resnick (2008, p.21), in many countries with concentrated 
ownership, conflicts of interests are greater between large controlling shareholders and 
small outside shareholders, than between managers and shareholders. They also make 
reference  to  studies  undertaken  by  La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and  Vishny 
(LLSV) which document “sharp differences between countries” in respect of: 
-  corporate ownership structures 
-  depth and breadth of capital markets 
-  access of firms to external financing 
-  dividend policies. 
  LLSV, are cited by Eun and Resnick as stating that “such differences can be explained 
largely by how well investors are protected by law from expropriation by the managers 
and  controlling  shareholders  of  firms.”  Furthermore,  they  highlight  observations  that 
English  common  law  countries,  such  as  Canada,  the  U.S  and  the  U.K,  provide  the 
strongest  form  of  protection  for  investors  whilst  French  civil  law  countries  such  as 
Belgium, Italy, and Mexico, provide the weakest. 
It is therefore interesting to note that whilst there are conflicting views in respect of the 
degree  of  agency  problems  which  arise  under  dispersed  and  concentrated  ownership 
structures, it appears that additional or greater agency problems will eventually necessitate 
the need for greater monitoring. Ownership of shares definitely also has a role to play in 
ensuring  greater  monitoring  -  however  where  a  more  harmonious  relationship  exists 
between principal and agent - particularly based on trust and long term relationships, the 
principal may see no reason to undertake “unnecessary” levels of monitoring - which may 
be considered costly. In other words, the traditional professional business like principal-
agent relationship is transformed over a long period of term during which the long term 
harmonious  relationship  is  sustained.  In  this  respect,  the  traditional  principal  agent 
relationship in concentrated ownership systems and structures would exist not between 
dominant  shareholders  and  the  agent  -  rather  between  the  agent  and  the  minority 
shareholders. The minority shareholders, unfortunately, are unable to afford or commit 
the same level of control or funds (as that available to dominant shareholders), necessary 
to monitor the agent. In addition to the fact that dominant shareholders avail over more Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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resources and control, monitoring by minority shareholders is made even more difficult 
given the increased lack of transparency which has arisen over the years - owing to the rise 
of conglomerates and complex structures., 
Comparative analysis between ownership systems                                                   
and structures operating in selected jurisdictions:                                                     
The UK, Germany, India, the US and Japan 
This  section  considers  the  two  main  ownership  systems  and  structures  which  prevail 
across jurisdictions, namely, dispersed ownership systems and concentrated ownership 
systems. In respect of the former, reference will be made to the U.K and the U.S whilst a 
consideration  and  analysis  of  concentrated  ownership  systems  will  consider  such 
jurisdictions  as  Germany  India  and  Japan.  From  this  broad  categorisation  into 
concentrated and dispersed ownership system and structures, a further distinction will be 
sought between developing concentrated ownership systems (India) and more developed 
concentrated ownership systems (Germany and Japan). 
Whilst it is argued that some of the costs and benefits resulting from the presence of large 
shareholders (as illustrated in developed economies) could be as equally relevant in the 
context of developing countries, certain reasons are propounded for the inability to simply 
“extrapolate” experiences of corporate governance in developed countries into developing 
countries (Sarkar, 2010): 
-  Some of the institutional specificities of developing countries - such as a less developed 
capital  market,  less  active  takeover  markets,  absence  of  well  developed  managerial 
market, may impact costs and benefits of large shareholdings in countries uniquely 
(Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000) 
-  Monitoring by large shareholders in developing countries may not be as effective as in 
developed  countries  because  of  poor  availability  of  information  on  performance 
parameters of firms - owing to inadequate disclosure standards and weak enforcement 
mechanisms, as well as opaqueness associated with insider ownership and concentrated 
ownership structures. 
Concentrated and dispersed ownership systems and structures 
Concentrated ownership structures. Germany 
According to Jürgens and Rupp (2002, p.3), Germany is often cited as a classical case of 
“non-shareholder value orientation” whose production-oriented, long term, risk averse 
and consensus-driven values, have been contrasted often with the Anglo-Saxon approach. 
In addition to management, insiders within the German system of corporate governance 
are highlighted to be large shareholders, lenders and labour (Odenius, 2008). 
Forces considered to be currently responsible for the move towards a “shareholder value 
orientation” are summarised as follows (Jürgens and Rupp, 2002, p.3): 
-  state measures to deregulate financial markets 
-  pressure of managers of investment and pension funds (in particular from the u.s.a) 
-  responses to product market changes 
-  internationalisation of production. 
In Germany, the corporate board is not “legally charged” with representing the interests 
of  shareholders  -  rather,  it  is  mandated  with  looking  after  interests  of  stakeholders 
generally, and not just shareholders (Eun and Resnick, 2008, p.84). As well as a two tier 
board system, comprising the supervisory and management boards, which exists under the Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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codetermination  system,  it  is  legally  mandated  that  workers  are  represented  on  the 
supervisory board - a similar situation to that which exists in the U.S where some U.S 
companies have labour unions representatives on their boards - although this is not legally 
mandated (Ibid, p.84). In the UK, based on the Cadbury's Committee's recommendation, 
many public companies voluntarily abide by the Code of Best Practice which recommends 
that there should be at least three outside directors and that the board chairman and the 
CEO should be different individuals. 
Three unique characteristics peculiar to                                                                                
German system of corporate governance 
The three pillars on which the “traditional German system of corporate governance” are 
considered to lie, are as follows (Jürgens and Rupp, 2002, p.7): 
-  dominant role of banks in a complex system of cross shareholding and in company 
financing 
-  system of industrial co-determination 
-  production-oriented, company-centred management system. 
The above mentioned three unique characteristics of the German system of corporate 
governance, are considered by Odenius (2008, p.9) to contribute to difficulties in attaining 
corporate  governance  objectives.  The  problem  of  “self  dealing”  -  “asset  diverting 
behaviour  on  the  part  of  insiders  to  the  detriment  of  outsiders,  typically  minority 
shareholders”,  is  also  highlighted.  Furthermore,  high  ownership  concentration  and 
managerial control by insiders are not only considered to encourage the rise of risk of 
managerial  fraud,  but  are  also  illustrated  by  way  of  managerial  fraud  cases  such  as 
Parmalat.  
The above mentioned complexities, complex ownership structures, as well as problems 
attributed  to  opacity  -  these  arising  from  complicated  transparency  and  complex 
ownership  structures,  are  features  which  will  be  demonstrated  in  other  concentrated 
ownership structure jurisdictions - namely, India and Japan.  
In Germany, share ownership is heavily concentrated - with over half of all shares being 
owned by non financial companies, banks and insurance companies - main motive of 
shareholding being to strengthen long term relationships and business interdepencies, as 
well as long term commitment (Jürgens and Rupp, 2002, p.9). According to Jürgens and 
Rupp (Ibid, p.10), whilst the ownership stake of banks is substantial, their dominating role 
is based less on direct share ownership than a system of proxy voting (Depotstimmrecht) - 
under which votes are cast for other shareholders. 
Effects of Shift Towards Less Domination by Banks and Impact of the Development of 
Financial Markets as Impetus For Changes to Corporate System in Germany 
The status of banks as “dominant shareholders (mainly by proxy)”, according to Jürgens 
and  Rupp,  provides  explanation  for  why  bank  representatives  are  prevalent  on  most 
companies' supervisory boards (Ibid, p.11). 
Effective corporate governance mechanisms is considered to include both (Kaur and Gill, 
2008, p.5): 
-  Internal mechanisms such as board of directors and their major committees 
-  External mechanisms such as hostile takeover bids, leveraged buyouts, proxy contests, 
legal protection of minority shareholders, the disciplining of managers in the external 
labour markets. 
Odenius  also  adds  that  external  control  mechanisms  are  important  complementary 
mechanisms  to  internal  control  mechanisms.  Leveraged  buyouts,  as  well  as  hostile 
takeovers  are  considered to  be  more  difficult  in  environments involving  concentrated Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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ownership systems and structures than in dispersed ownership systems. For these and 
other reasons which will be highlighted as follows, the dominance of banks on companies' 
supervisory boards, as well as their influence on minority shareholders has constituted the 
topic of various debates. Opposing views regarding the interests and disadvantages of the 
“historically prominent role of banks” in the German corporate governance system are 
illustrated thus: 
-  Through  their  continued  presence  at  shareholders'  meetings,  banks  provide  an 
independent  outside  monitor  of  corporate  decision  making.  Outside  monitoring, 
serving to alleviate the so called “free rider problem” which arises whenever many 
small  shareholders  have  to  form  a  common  standpoint  vis-a-vis  top  management 
Jürgens and Rupp, 2002, p.15). 
In opposing the above view, it is further illustrated by Wenger and Kaserer that (Ibid, 
p.16): 
-  In reality, a large number of German banks are sheltered from outside pressures by a 
dense  network  of  cross  holdings,  proxy  votes  and  wider  developed  disclosure 
obligations.  Therefore  bank  managers  are  not  forced  to  pursue  value  maximizing 
investments and monitoring policies. 
Hence opacity is also a feature which appears to be prevalent in Germany and such issues 
of opacity will be illustrated in prevailing characteristics which also exist  in India in the 
next  section  -  as  well  as  considered  under  the  ownership  structures  and  systems  of 
governance in Japan.  
As indicated by Odenius, since both stakeholder and shareholder systems should aim to 
maximize flexibility, and observing that both systems have their comparative advantages 
and specific agency risks, “system selection should be left to markets as final arbitrators 
and therefore the normative challenge is to devise regulatory frameworks within which the 
open competition between different forms of ownership structures can take place, without 
distortion” (Odenius, 2008, p.6).  
The extent to which such “system selection” should be left to markets being another 
matter for regulatory authorities to determine. As revealed by recent financial crises, the 
Efficient  Markets  Hypothesis  or  the  Efficient  Capital  Markets  Hypothesis,  cannot  be 
effectively  relied  upon  in  assuming  that  little  role  exists  for  regulation  and regulatory 
authorities - since other factors, and particularly unpredictable and uncontrollable factors - 
such as risks, have taken centre stage over the years. Environments in which financial 
markets  existed,  when  compared  to  over  forty  years  ago,  have  evolved  and  changed 
considerably - not only with respect to the types of products being transacted within such 
markets, but also as a result of the nature of transacting institutions, the existence of 
shadow banking activities, the evolution of more complex forms of risks, as well as the 
blurring distinction between what constitutes banking or investment activities.   
India 
In India, the “traditional culture of big corporate family owned houses” or blocks of 
shareholding, are considered to prevail (Kaur and Gill, 2008, p.3). Based on evidence from 
insignificant shareholding of individuals in sample companies, Kaur and Gill illustrate how 
individual shareholders have no incentive and no capability to monitor and influence the 
behaviour of management. They also add that in contrast to findings on other emerging 
economies in Asia, that “affiliations with banks and institutions” are not a prominent 
feature of Indian corporations (Ibid, p.4). 
Firms  which  have  large  controlling  shareholders  can  be  distinguished  from  those  of 
publicly held corporations whose shareholders are so numerous and small that they are 
unable to effectively control decisions of the management team, in the sense that “a large 
controlling shareholder has both the incentives and power to control the management Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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team's actions” (Srivastava, 2011, p.1).  According to Srivastava, the main problem then 
becomes controlling the large shareholder's abuse of minority shareholders. As indicated 
in  earlier  sections  of  this  paper,  in  certain  countries  with  concentrated  ownership 
structures  (for example, countries such as France, Germany and Italy - where families 
own large blocks of shares and dominate corporate structures), effective control  and 
corporate governance measures exists since such owners are able to access the required 
resources needed to engage in monitoring activities - hence resulting in less information 
asymmetries.  However,  transparency  is  also  an  issue  in  many  countries  where 
concentrated ownership structures prevail.  
Furthermore,  Srivastava  adds  that  holders  of  a  majority  of  the  voting  shares  in  a 
corporation, will therefore, through (Ibid): 
-  their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors 
-   as well as being able determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on other matters, 
be able to acquire immense power to the extent of benefiting themselves at the expense of 
minority shareholders. Kaur and Gill (2008, p.5) also lend their support to this view by 
stating  that  one  of  the  major  governance  challenges  in  India  lies  with  unaddressed 
conflicts between dominant shareholders and minority shareholders.  
Firms with highly concentrated shareholdings are considered more likely to be able to 
transfer business risks to third party insurance companies - as a means of reducing costs. 
It is argued that the role of ownership structures, and particularly concentrated ownership, 
as means of corporate governance measure1 in monitoring management, may constitute 
the reason why banks may be more willing to lend, as well as also a reason for the degree 
of ability by such concentrated ownership firms to obtain property insurance in more debt 
based lending jurisdictions such as India than in the UK and the U.S.   
Results of a study by Jia, Adams and Buckle (2009, p.6) highlight the fact that “firms with 
more insider ownership, greater leverage, more growth options, more tangible assets and 
publicly listed firms, are more likely to purchase property insurance.” 
Would this imply that such firms are able to manage their risks more effectively? 
Chakrabarti,  Megginson  and  Yadav  are  cited  as  highlighting  the  fact  that  ownership 
structure could have significant influences on the risk management and internal control 
decisions of Indian firms (Jia, Adams and Buckle, 2009, p.5).2 
Similar views are illustrated by Zou and Adams (2008) in an analysis which is provided on 
corporate ownership and equity risks in China. Liability insurance, according to Jia, Adams 
and Buckle (see Sinha, 2004), are not as popular compared with property insurance lines 
of business, owing to relatively undeveloped legal tort systems. 
Some  of  the  following  are  factors,  which  according  to  Jia,  Adams  and  Buckle,  are 
considered to be influential and beneficial in corporations' decisions to obtain property 
insurance - particularly in India (Jia, Adams and Buckle, 2009, pp. 2 and 7): 
-  Insurance serves as a commonly used risk management technique which is important 
for firms in developing countries because unanticipated (uninsured) losses can result in 
reallocation of resources from those resources for planned long term investment to 
                                                 
1  Sarkar  adds  that  with  diffuse  ownership  structures,  agency  problems  arise  on  account  of  shareholder 
manager conflicts (Type 1 or vertical agency problems) whilst with concentrated ownership and control, 
agency problems arise primarily due to conflicts between the two categories of principals – the controlling 
inside shareholders  (dominant shareholders) and the dispersed minority outside shareholders (this being 
referred  to  as  Type  II  or  horizontal  agency  problems).  Hence,  the  role  of  ownership  strcuture  as  a 
mechanism of corporate governance is considered likely to be alleviated under concentrated ownership and 
control “since incentives of controlling shareholders to monitor management would be stronger on account 
of their substantial stakes in the corporation.” It is however, further argued that this does not preclude Type 
II agency problems. See particularly Morck and Yeung (2004) and Sarkar (2010). 
2  The transfer of of business risk to third party insurance companies as an alternative means to risk retention 
“within an undiversified ownership structure”, is also highlighted. Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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those associated for tasks of reconstruction; 
-  The presence of appropriate levels of property insurance cover allows debtholders' 
payoffs to become relatively independent of project selection and in so doing, limits 
the ability of borrowing firms to shift business risk to debt holders.1 
-  The ability of insurance to mitigate agency incentive conflicts in firms is expected to be 
particularly important in India where publicly quoted and non quoted companies tend 
to rely heavily on debt financing - particularly from banks (this being also attributed to 
the  fact  that  the  issue  of  public  equity  is  strictly  controlled  by  the  Securities  and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI). 
It is also to be added that apart from the complexity of ownership structure, an important 
source of agency costs in Indian listed companies which makes it difficult for outsiders to 
ascertain the complete chain of ownership and control between firms, is the opacity of 
ownership structures (Sarkar, 2010). Hence the legal and regulatory system in India will 
have  an  immense  role  to  play  in  providing  more  effective  corporate  governance 
mechanisms, as well as in facilitating economic growth and the development of ownership 
structures  and  systems  in  India.  In  India,  the  regulatory  framework  of  corporate 
governance consists of the Companies Act, the Listing Agreement, the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act 1992, the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 1956, 
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985. 
Japan. Dominance of banks and barriers to external                                                                 
corporate governance controls 
The  dominance  of banks  and  financial  investors  in  the  Japanese  corporate system  of 
governance is reflected thus (Altunbas, Kara, and van Rixtel, 2007): 
-  Results reveal that the equity investments of financial investors (institutional investors 
and  banks)  in  Japanese  listed  companies  were  predominantly  in  high  tech 
manufacturing, traditional manufacturing and communications industries. All financial 
investors combined, held more than 60% of the equity capital of the firms listed on the 
Tokyo  and  Osaka  Stock  Exchanges  -  with  banks  being  the  largest  group  of  such 
investors. 
The dominance of banks in concentrated ownership structures and systems such as Japan 
and Germany has already been discussed. It was earlier highlighted that concerns are 
directed particularly at the level of protection which is afforded to minority shareholders 
in cases where such dominance prevails. This is particularly the case given the rarity of 
external corporate governance measures - such as take-overs. 
It is acknowledged that whilst hostile takeovers are rare in Japan, they are commonplace in 
the U.S and U.K - the role of cross shareholdings as “formidable” barriers to hostile 
takeovers in Japan being also highlighted (Allen and Zhao, 2007). 
Further such flaws attributed to a “lack of market for corporate control” in Germany and 
Japan, possible weaknesses resulting from financial banking institutions acting as outside 
monitors - particularly the long-term relationships between banks and those firms they are 
supposed to be monitoring are areas of concern. Such long term relationships having the 
tendency to alter the traditional and assumedly professional principal- agency relationships 
supposed to exist between such banks and their clients.  
Whilst  long  term  relationships  definitely  foster  a  better  environment  to  improve 
communication and address agency problems, too much proximity between banks and 
client firms could also result in the abuse of rights of the minority shareholders. The level 
of  proximity  between  banks  and  client  firms  can  be  determined  by  the  level  of 
                                                 
1  Jia, Adams and Buckle (2009) also argue further that corporate purchase of property insurance could help 
mitigate borrowers' assets substitution incentives - hence lowering lenders' risk exposures. Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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engagement of minority shareholders in matters relating to communication between the 
respective parties. Whilst frequent communication  between banks and client firms may 
certainly enhance a greater degree of proximity between both parties, the potential abuse 
of  minority  shareholders'  rights  might  be  avoided  or  mitigated  where  such  minority 
shareholders are engaged (to an acceptable degree, as agreed by all parties involved), in the 
communications taking place.  
Other institutions for monitoring and disciplining corporate management in Japan, as 
identified include (Altunbas, Kara, and van Rixtel, 2007, p.14): 
-  corporate groups (Keiretsu) 
-  the “main bank” system 
-  concentrated shareholdings. 
Altunbas, Kara and van Rixtel also refer to results of various studies which highlight the 
fact that financial liberalisation and globalisation - as well as “structural changes in the 
flow  of  funds  and  related  diversification  of  the  sources  of  corporate  finance”,  have 
undermined the foundation of the “main bank” system (Ibid, p.17). The organisation of 
Keiretsu conglomerates around large commercial banks, it is further observed (Ibid), has 
been “significantly undermined - owing to revolutionary merger processes in the Japanese 
banking industry” which involved banks that traditionally belonged to various Keiretsu. 
According to Sakai and Asaoka (2003, p.5): 
-  Despite the progress of deregulation and market mechanism, Japan is facing ongoing 
recessions  after  the  bubble  economy.  One  of  the  reasons  is  the  malfunctioning 
corporate governance, the demerits of insider type governance as represented by main 
bank system and cross - shareholding, brought to light. Lingering bad debt problems 
also mean that main bank system could not discipline the management any more. 
Then, why does insider type governance does not work well in current Japan? 
The reasons, as suggested by them, are, as follows: 
-  indirect finance to direct finance by financial deregulation 
-  deregulation of Japanese financial markets, as well as alternatives to bank debt have 
become available to large Japanese firms. 
  Financial liberalisation is definitely an obvious response and confirmation to the above 
suggestions - having also considered  other opinions on the topic. However, it would be 
premature  to  conclude  that  this  constitutes  the  only  reason  why  the  insider  type  of 
governance  has  not  been  functioning  well  in  Japan.  Other  possible  considerations 
including dominant banking institutions acting as outside monitors - as well as lack of 
external corporate governance controls.  
Further, the shift in external sources of funding “the replacement of bank loans with 
direct  borrowing  from  capital  markets,  such  as  bonds  and  commercial  paper”  is 
highlighted (Sakai and Asaoka, 2003, p.6).   
According to an interim report by the Corporate Governance Forum of Japan (Corporate 
Governance  Committee,  1997,  pp.6  and  7),  the  conventional  Japanese  corporate 
governance model consists of a dual structure composed of: 
-  the board of directors - which execute functions of strategic decision making 
-  the board of auditors - which audit management's execution of business activities. 
Furthermore, it is highlighted by the report that the board of auditors execute “ex post 
facto” auditing whilst the board of directors do not have real decision making power - 
with decisions actually being taken by the “management board” or the management board 
of directors. It is also added that in actual fact, “most members of the board of directors 
are  executive  directors  selected  from  within  the  company”  -  hence  making  effective 
governance difficult to achieve. Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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In their article, Allen and Zhao (2007) highlight that in contrast to the Anglo-American 
system of corporate governance which focuses on the “narrow goal” of ensuring wealth 
maximisation of shareholders, that the Japanese approach, a focus on a wider range of 
stakeholders, could be more efficient. 
Further,  they  relate  the  U.K,  U.S  style  of  governance  and  wealth  maximisation  of 
shareholders to Adam Smith's invisible hand theory (Smith, 1776) of the market through 
which they highlight the point that “if firms maximise the wealth of their shareholders and 
individuals pursue their own interests, then the allocation of resources is efficient in the 
sense that nobody can be made better off without making somebody worse off” (Allen 
and Zhao, 2007, pp.2-3). 
Allen and Zhao provide further support for the Japanese approach of a broader view and 
objective (Ibid, p.3) in focussing on a broader range of shareholders since, in their view, a 
consideration and application of Adam Smith's invisible hand, is more relevant in a world 
or market without externalities. 
Is it really the case then, that a “better allocation of resources can be achieved by firms” 
under the broader view than is the case where a narrow approach (synonymous with that 
adopted by Anglo American systems) is adopted? Allen and Zhou however, have not 
taken into consideration other costs, demerits and disadvantages arising from complex 
concentrated structures.  
The following section attempts to address certain features and characteristics of dispersed 
ownership  structures  and  systems  as  well  as  draw  comparisons  between  the  Anglo 
American system of corporate governance and that of Japan. 
Dispersed ownership systems and structures 
UK and US 
It is generally acknowledged that the legal framework for corporate governance in the U.S, 
U.K,  Canada  and  other  English  common  law  countries  offer  strong  protection  for 
shareholders. Differences in the U.S, UK style of corporate governance and that which 
exists in Japan are highlighted within the following contexts (Ibid, pp.6-7):  
-  board of directors 
-  executive compensation 
-  the managerial organization of corporations 
-  the market for corporate control 
-  concentrated holdings and monitoring by financial institutions. 
In contrast to the Anglo American system of corporate governance, costs of concentrated 
ownership structure systems include (Altunbas, Kara, and van Rixtel, 2007, p.13): 
-  Reduced liquidity and higher risks for large shareholders - owing to concentration of 
their investments in one specific company 
-  A relatively underdeveloped market for corporate control 
-  Risk for small shareholders that large shareholders can extract private benefits from 
the company. 
Further, “direct control” through debt, takes place by means of “relationship banking” 
under concentrated ownership structures. 
The risk for small shareholders - that large shareholders could extract private benefits 
from the company, in relation to the above, is particularly more profound given the rise of 
complex financial and corporate structures, conglomerates, increased lack of transparency Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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and  the  corresponding  and  consequential    increased  information  asymmetries  arising 
therefrom. 
Board of directors 
Whilst the board of directors in the UK and the U.S are elected by shareholders (such 
board consisting of outside and inside directors), a distinction between the composition of 
such boards can be made in the sense that in the U.S, a majority are typically from outside 
the firm, whilst in the U.K, a minority are from outside the firm (Allen and Zhao, 2007, 
p.7). In contrast, the structure of Japanese boards of directors is such that shareholders 
actually  do  not  have  much  influence  -  even  though  in  theory,  rights  of  Japanese 
shareholders are supposed to be greater than those of shareholders in the U.S and the U.K 
(Ibid).1 
A prominent feature of UK codes is illustrated by way of the “Agency Cost Reducing 
Measure” whose objective is to increase independence and monitoring ability of Board 
whilst  curtailing  the  powers  of  management  through  the  ending  of  the  CEO  duality 
characteristic. In this sense, a creation of an outsider director as a Chair is undertaken as 
substitute for the previous CEO dual position which embodied separate roles of Chair 
and CEO (Burton, P., 2000, p.196). 
Conclusion: The role of the external auditor in incorporating                           
beneficial strategies into business and management models 
The fact that fraud cases are probably more reported in the U.S than (certain) other 
jurisdictions should rather, provide some encouragement that there is greater level of 
transparency and disclosure in operation than is the case with jurisdictions where less 
transparency and less effective corporate governance mechanisms are in operation. 
It is certainly the case that less or limited roles exist for external auditors in particular 
jurisdictions than others. This is certainly the case with China where it is observed by 
certain academics that the institutional background in China is different from western 
countries, such as "flight from audit quality" in Defond et al. (2000). Furthermore, it is 
argued that Chinese companies may not have the demand for high audit quality, which 
may  lead  to  a  different  role  played  by  external  auditors  in  China. However,  China  is 
certainly doing its best to adopt Basel rules - particularly Basel III regulations in a timely 
manner and fashion and it will be interesting to see how other aspects of Basel rules and 
regulations impact on the levels of disclosure and transparency in financial regulation - 
both as regards the structure, systems and framework. 
And whilst a change from insider type governance (concentrated ownership structures) to 
outsider type governance (dispersed ownership) may be generally advocated in certain 
jurisdictions, as rightly observed, by Sakai and Asaoka (2003, pp.6-7): it should be noted 
“...that institutional complementarities exist among the Japanese corporate governance 
system,  including  main  bank  system  and  cross  share  -holding,  labor  system,  business 
transaction  system,  financial  system,  and  legal  system.  Because  of  institutional 
complementarities among the systems, changing the corporate governance system alone 
would likely yield an undesired outcome.” 
Effective corporate governance measures and control may exist in certain countries with 
concentrated ownership structures  (for example, countries such as France, Germany and 
Italy - where families own large blocks of shares and dominate corporate structures), since 
such owners are able to access the required resources needed to engage in monitoring 
                                                 
1  It is also highlighted that over the years, the size of boards have been reformed to bring them in line with 
UK and U.S boards. Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures | BEH: www.beh.pradec.eu 
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activities - hence resulting in less information asymmetries. However, transparency is also 
an issue in many countries where concentrated ownership structures prevail. However, it 
needs to be mentioned that within dispersed ownership structures - a prominent example 
being the U.S, many cases prevail whereby family-controlled and dominated structures 
also exist. 
For these reasons, the level of monitoring being undertaken or required in dispersed or 
concentrated ownership systems and structures would require a closer consideration and 
examination of the level of complexity of structures prevailing within these jurisdictions, 
the level of transparency governing such structures, and the degree of communication 
between  the  parties  involved  -  be  it  between  the  principal  or  agent  or  between  the 
dominant and minority shareholders. 
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